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Do media broadcasts matter when they reach audiences that are not their target? In a conflict, the media
may have an unintended effect of increasing ethnic animosity. We consider radio signals travelling
across country borders in the region that witnessed one of Europe’s deadliest conflicts since WWII:
the Serbo-Croatian conflict in the Yugoslavian wars. Using survey data, we find that a large fraction
of Croats listen to Serbian radio (intended for Serbian listeners across the border) whenever signal
is available. Then, using official election results, we document that residents of Croatian villages with
good-quality signal of Serbian public radio were more likely to vote for extreme nationalist parties,
even after several years of peace time. Finally, ethnically-offensive graffiti are more likely to be exposed
openly in the center of villages with Serbian radio reception. The effect is identified from the variation
in the availability of the signal mostly due to topography and forestation. The results of a laboratory
experiment confirm that Serbian radio exposure causes an increase in anti-Serbian sentiment among
Croats.
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A number of recent papers suggest that media outlets have substantial persuasion 
power over their audiences. They affect political views and behavior both in times of peace 
(e.g., Strömberg 2004; Gentzkow 2006; DellaVigna and Kaplan 2007; Gerber, Karlan, and 
Bergan 2009; Knight and Chiang forthcoming; Eisensee and Strömberg 2007; Snyder and 
Strömberg 2010; Enikolopov, Petrova, and Zhuravskaya forthcoming; Oberholzer-Gee and 
Waldfogel forthcoming) and in times of conflict (e.g., Lasswell 1971; Childs 1972; Wolfsfeld 
1997; Snyder 2000; Yanagizawa 2009). In these cases, persuasion occurs as media broadcasts 
reach their intended audience. 
Do media broadcasts have a similar effect when they reach an audience they did not 
aim to reach? An important instance of unintended media audiences occurs in towns near a 
country border, as the audience on one side of the border receives the media intended for the 
other side. 
The unintended cross-border media effect may be particularly important between 
countries recently involved in conflict. The exposure to media content of a former enemy 
may trigger nationalistic sentiment, making future conflict more likely. It is also possible, 
however, that the cross-border impact of media is negligible, particularly if people mostly 
listen to media outlets that support their own views (Sunstein, 2001; Gentzkow and Shapiro, 
2011; Durante and Knight, forthcoming). Clarifying the extent to which such cross-border 
media effects trigger nationalism is relevant for our understanding of conflict and of the 
impact of the media. 
This paper examines the impact of cross-border media exposure on nationalistic 
behavior in the context of one of Europe’s deadliest conflicts since WWII, namely, the Serbo-
Croatian conflict in the 1991-95 Yugoslavian wars. The region of Croatia near the Serbian-
Croatian border (officially called Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Srijem) was place 
of a full-scale armed conflict between Serbs and Croats in 1991 and was under Serbian 
occupation till 1995. The military operations of the Serbian-Croatian conflict ended in 1995 
and Slobodan Milošević—the former president of Serbia—was overthrown in 2000 and 
handed to the Hague International Criminal Tribunal. Still, the public media in Serbia 
continues to promote Serbian nationalism. In particular, public radio stations
1 (i.e., radios of 
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the Radio-Television of Serbia group, RTS, also known as Serbian Broadcasting Corporation) 
operate with the official mission to strengthen Serbian national identity (IREX 2010). 
The Serb-Croat case is a nearly ideal setting to study cross-border effects of media. 
The signal of Serbian public radio intended for internal consumption of Serbs inside Serbia 
reaches several, but not all, villages in this region of Croatia. As Serbs and Croats speak the 
same language, despite using different alphabets, Croats can fully understand Serbian radio.
2 
We are able to narrow down the analysis of cross-border effects of media to radio content for 
two reasons. First, radio is the primary media source in this area. Second, due to different 
alphabets, the press and even television, which often broadcasts foreign programs with 
subtitles, do not travel as easily across border.   
We use detailed village-level information on media reception, voting, and other 
nationalistic behavior to answer two key questions: Do Croats actually listen to Serbian radio 
when it is available? If so, does Serbian radio have any effect on their political views and 
attitudes towards Serbs? 
Using a street survey of residents of Croatian villages located close to the Serbian 
border, we find that the answer to the first question is positive. In areas where Serbian radio 
signal is available without any special amplifiers, 87% of respondents are aware of getting 
the signal; whereas in areas where a special amplifier is needed to get reception, 56% of 
respondents report having access to Serbian radio. Among those who responded positively to 
the question whether they get Serbian radio, 78% of respondents acknowledge that they listen 
to Serbian radio occasionally, and one half admits to listening to Serbian radio at least several 
times a month. The high percentage of listeners of Serbian radio among Croats may seem 
puzzling in light of the general view that consumers sort into media outlets that conform to 
their political beliefs. Anecdotal evidence from the authors’ interviews with Croatian media 
experts suggests two main reasons for cross-border listening. Some Croats tune in to Serbian 
radio to listen to Serbian singers from the times of Socialist Yugoslavia which are still 
popular among Croats, and in doing so encounter also political content. Others are interested 
in getting information about the scale of anti-Croatian sentiment in Serbia or are interested in 
hearing a different point of view. 
Does Serbian radio then affect the political views of Croats? We estimate the effect of 
Serbian radio on the propensity to vote for extremist nationalist parties and other political 
parties, voter turnout, and expressions of ethnic hatred and nationalism in Croatia. Our 
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identification strategy relies on variation in the availability of Serbian radio among different 
villages in the border region. The main drivers of this variation are topography and the 
presence of forests in near proximity of the village. We use data on actual availability of 
Serbian (RTS) radios in 138 villages in the region adjacent to Serbian border, measured using 
an ordinary receiver without an amplifier. We also compute signal strength of Serbian radios 
using information on transmitters and the topography of the region for all 948 villages in an 
extended area of Croatia. Combining data on the actual reception and signal strength, we 
predict the availability of Serbian radio for the extended set of villages. 
In both the baseline and extended sample, we find that availability of Serbian (RTS) 
radio significantly increased vote for extremist nationalist political parties during the last 
2007 Parliamentary election. The effect is larger where the reception of the radio signal is 
stronger. The magnitude of the estimates suggests that a substantial part of the total vote for 
ultra-nationalist parties in the border region of Croatia is explained by the reception of 
Serbian public radio.  
A key potential confound is that the results could be due to an omitted variable which 
is correlated with both nationalistic sentiment and the reception of Serbian radio. We find, 
however, that adding extra geographic and demographic controls generally makes the 
estimated results larger. The Altonji, Elder, Taber (2005) test, therefore, suggests that 
unobservables are likely to bias the estimates downward, rather than upward. 
To quantify the effect, we compute a persuasion rate, i.e., the fraction of Croats who 
changed their voting behavior in response to Serbian radio among those who were exposed to 
it (DellaVigna and Kaplan 2007; DellaVigna and Gentzkow 2010). To compute the exposure 
rate we use the street survey of residents outlined above. The implied persuasion rate of 4% 
to 5% is on the lower end of the estimates in the literature of persuasion rates of media on 
their intended recipients.  
We also consider a direct measure of nationalistic behavior, the presence of graffiti 
offensive to Serbs in the open spaces in the village. We find some evidence that the 
likelihood of having ethnically-offensive graffiti in the village center is higher in places 
where Serbian radio is available. 
To provide further evidence on the impact of radio exposure, we conducted a 
laboratory experiment. Eighty ethnic Croatian students of Vukovar University listened to 
different remixes of radio broadcasts and were then questioned on their attitudes towards 
different ethnic groups and political parties. Students were randomly allocated into three 
groups: the control group listened to a remix of Croatian radios; the first treatment listened to 4 
 
a remix of Croatian radios and Serbian public (RTS) radios; and the second treatment listened 
to a remix of Croatian and Serbian private radio (B92), which is known for its more neutral 
attitude towards Croats. Compared to the control group, the two groups exposed to Serbian 
radio display significantly heightened animosity towards Serbs in attitude questions, and the 
increase is larger for the group exposed to RTS radio. There is also weaker evidence that 
exposure to Serbian radio increased the self-reported preference for nationalistic parties. As 
predicted, neither of the treatments changed subjects’ attitude towards other ethnic groups, 
i.e., Bosnians or Hungarians. Since subjects treated with Serbian nationalistic public radio, 
openly hostile to Croats, were more affected by the experiment than those treated with 
Serbian radio, neutral towards Croats, we conclude that most of the estimated effect of 
Serbian public radio comes from reminding Croats specifically about concurrent Serbian 
nationalism and anti-Croatian rhetoric rather than reminding them that their former enemy is 
just across the border. 
Overall, our results suggest that Serbian public radio hostile to Croats appears to have 
an important effect working across the border which results in a substantial increase in 
extremist nationalistic sentiment among Croatian population. 
Our paper is related to the burgeoning literature on the effect of media on voting, cited 
above. Much of this literature focuses on developed countries. We contribute to the more 
limited evidence on the effects of media on voting outside the developed world (e.g., Lawson 
and McCann 2005; Olken 2009; and Enikolopov, Petrova, and Zhuravskaya forthcoming), 
focusing in particular on cross-border media effects. 
Within the media literature, the paper is more closely related to Yanagizawa (2009), 
Gentzkow and Shapiro (2004), and Hainmueller and Kern (2009). Yanagizawa (2009) uses 
variation in radio coverage generated by hills in the line-of-sight between radio transmitters 
and villages to investigate the effect of “hate speech” of RTLM radio on casualties from the 
genocide in Rwanda in 1994. Gentzkow and Shapiro (2004) argue that media in Arabic 
countries biased against the US reinforces anti-American sentiment in the population. While 
these papers measure the effects of propaganda in fueling ethnic animosity on the intended 
audiences, we examine the unintended media effect as a catalyst of ethnic hatred. In contrast 
to these papers, our analysis also combines evidence from a survey of individuals and a 
laboratory experiment to complement the field village-level evidence. Hainmueller and Kern 
(2009) examine one form of unintended cross-border effects by showing that the availability 
of free West German TV increased the support of the communist regime in German 
Democratic Republic by providing otherwise-missing entertainment to East Germans. The 5 
 
cross-border effect which we consider is, arguably, more widely applicable as one can expect 
such an effect to be present in many other conflict environments. 
Our findings are also related to the literature on the determinants of voting for fascist 
and ultra-nationalist parties. So far, research on this subject has focused mainly on two 
determinants of ultra-nationalist voting: protest against policies offered by moderate parties 
(Voerman and Lucardie 1992: 48-49; Westle and Niedermayer 1992: 95-97; Mayer and 
Pemneau 1992: 133-134; Childers 1983; Falter and Zintl 1988) and the priority of economic 
over nationalistic issues for voters on parties’ agenda (Lipset 1960; Himmelweit et al. 1981; 
King et al. 2008).  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides background 
information on the conflict and the mass media in the former Yugoslavia and elections in 
Croatia. Section 3 presents our hypotheses and describes the data on outcomes. Section 4 
explains the variation in Serbian radio signal in Croatia. Section 5 presents the empirical 
results. Section 6 presents the results of the laboratory experiment and Section 7 concludes.  
2. Background 
Conflict. The Croatian-Serbian conflict (1991-1995) was one of several major open-
armed conflicts in the former Socialist Yugoslavia, known as Yugoslavian wars. Croatians 
are predominantly Catholic Christians, whereas Serbians are predominantly Orthodox 
Christians. Ethnic animosity between the two groups has deep historic roots and had been 
escalating at least since the 1980s. The armed conflict started in 1991. The Croatian side 
aimed at establishing a sovereign state independent of Yugoslavia, while the Serbian 
minority, which quickly got military support from Serbia, opposed the secession and wanted 
Croatia to remain a part of Yugoslavia (with the center in Belgrade, Serbian capital city). 
Subsequently there was a series of deadly military operations, which included massacres of 
civilians and ethnic cleansing on both sides. The conflict ended in 1995. Croatia became an 
independent country recognized by the international community. Estimates of the number of 
victims for the Croatian-Serbian conflict alone amount to roughly 500,000 displaced civilians 
and 20,000 casualties (the vast majority of which were civilians). The Yugoslavian wars were 
formally characterized as genocide. To investigate and prosecute Yugoslavian war crimes, 
the UN established the International Criminal Tribunal.  
A multitude of sources agrees that mass media played a crucial role in fueling ethnic 
animosity and escalating the conflict before and during disintegration of Socialist Yugoslavia 6 
 
(see, for instance, Thompson 1994; Kurspahić 2003, MacDonald and Bruce 2002; Kolar-
Panov 1997; Skiljan, 2000, and Hockenos 2003). In particular, Smajlović (1997), Kurspahić 
(2003) and MacDonald and Bruce (2002) present evidence that media outlets that belonged to 
the RTS media group, including Serbian public radio, were engaged in active pro-Serbian and 
anti-Croatian propaganda during the conflict. They actively supported the Milošević regime, 
denied Serbian aggression, and selectively covered information on victims of war from the 
the Serbian side. Smajlović (1997) reports results of surveys which show that most of the 
Serbian population trusted RTS news. 
Media. There are four major types of media in the region of our study: Croatian 
television, Croatian print media, Croatian radio, and Serbian radio. Croats in this region do 
not typically consume either Serbian print media or Serbian television. While it is easy for 
them to listen to Serbian radio, as they speak the same Serbo-Croatian language, it is more 
difficult for them to read Serbian newspapers, as Serbs use Cyrillics, whereas Croats use 
Latin alphabet. Watching Serbian television is similarly difficult as it often includes foreign 
programs that use Cyrillic subtitles. 
Of the four prominent media, Croatian television and print media play smaller roles 
relative to the radio in our region. In many areas, people do not possess television sets, but do 
own radio receivers. While we do not have data on TV and radio set ownership specifically 
for our region, in the whole country the number of TV sets was 281 per 1000 inhabitants and 
the number of radios was 336 per 1000 inhabitants in 2003. In the rural areas, which are the 
focus of the study, the imbalance in favor of radio receivers is likely to be larger. In addition, 
Croatian law requires that all legally-owned television sets be registered with a paid 
subscription to Croatian television channels. The price of monthly subscription is high by 
local standards (starting at 10€ per month), so typically residents in rural areas do not register 
their TV sets; without paid subscription, the quality of the TV signal is poor.
3 Regarding 
newspapers, poverty prevents many people in rural areas from buying print media; and in 
some villages there is no place to buy a newspaper. 
Given the constraints outlined above, radio has been the most important source of 
information about politics since the times of Socialist Yugoslavia.
 A typical Croatian listens 
to radio for approximately 250 minutes a day (Peruško and Jurlin 2006). Most people in the 
region do not turn off the radio during the day, and many listen to it on the streets. 
The radio market in Croatia is localized, with 3 national public channels having a 
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joint share of just 10% of radio audiences. (Peruško and Jurlin 2006). This stands in contrast 
to the high concentration and state ownership in television and newspaper markets. Local 
radio stations in Croatia are controlled by local governments that own 70% of the local media 
and indirectly control the remaining stations. Nearly half of the local radio stations do not 
make a profit and are financially dependent on support from local authorities (Peruško and 
Jurlin 2006). 
Parliamentary elections and parties in Croatia. The Croatian Parliament (Sabor) 
has one chamber, whose members are elected every four years. There are 10 multi-member 
electoral districts in mainland Croatia and an additional electoral district giving 
representation to Croatian diaspora living abroad. The electoral rule in each of these districts 
is proportional representation with closed party lists and the minimum of 5% of total vote 
cutoff necessary to get representation. In addition, 8 seats are reserved for ethnic minority 
representation. The last parliamentary election took place in November 2007. In total, 145 
representatives were elected from 11 districts representing 8 political parties (and party 
alliances). 
The two main political parties in Croatia (HDZ and SDP) have very different views 
on the issue of nationalism. The political party which got the largest share of the total vote 
(36.6%) and most seats (66) in 2007 is the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ, Hrvatska 
demokratska zajednica). It is the main center-right political party with a moderate nationalist 
pro-Croatian ideology. It was founded by nationalist dissidents in 1989 and led by Franjo 
Tuđman, the first president of Croatia. The party entered parliament in 1990 and positioned 
itself as anti-Communist and anti-Serbian-nationalism of Slobodan Milošević. During the war 
of independence, HDZ was in power and many members of the military were also members 
of the party. One of the new proclaimed goals of HDZ in the 2000s was the accession of 
Croatia into the EU, which moved the party substantially towards the center. 
The second largest political party in Croatia (with 56 seats and 31.2% of total vote in 
2007) is the Social Democratic Party of Croatia (SDP, Socijaldemokratska partija Hrvatske). 
It is the main center-left opposition party which is usually considered as the heir of the 
Communist Party of Croatia. Among all major political parties, SDP has the most neutral 
position vis-à-vis Serbia, and it is the most popular party among the Serbian minority in 
Croatia.  
The remaining 23 seats of the 2007 Sabor are shared among 6 political parties, which 
have a substantially smaller political base in the entire country, but a few of them have 
significant political support in specific parts of the country. In particular, as nationalistic 8 
 
sentiment is stronger in the border region with Serbia than in the rest of the country, the ultra-
nationalist political party, the Croatian Party of Rights (HSP, Hrvatska stranka prava), is 
fairly popular in this region. This party got 8% of the total vote in the northern part of the 
border region and 5.2% in the southern part and as a result gained 1 seat in the Croatian 
parliament of 2007. This party is the main extreme nationalist party in Croatia (Laqueur 
1997, Hislope 1997) with the ideology of supporting "the Great Croatia."
4 In the 1990s, HSP 
created its own paramilitary unit that aimed to secure Croatian independence from 
Yugoslavia (UNCE 1994) and used the symbols resembling those of the fascist state during 
the WWII.
5 After the war, two wings of HSP seceded because of internal conflicts among 
party leadership and formed independent political parties (HP-HPP and HCSP). These parties 
are very small, but they share the same ultra-nationalist ideology and find some 
(insignificant) support in the border region. 
The other political parties that got representation are as follows: two regionally-
oriented parties (Istrian Democratic Assembly, IDS, and Croatian Democratic Alliance of 
Slavonija and Baranja, HDSSB); a party with liberal ideology (HNS-LD); a single-issue 
pensioners party (HSU) and an agrarian socialist party (HSS - HSLS). 
For the purposes of our study, we characterize the main Croatian political parties 
according to the strength of their nationalistic rhetoric in 2007-2010. We consider HSP 
together with its former factions (HP-HPP and HCSP) as extreme nationalistic; HDZ as 
moderately nationalistic; and SDP as neutral.
6 
Region. Our main focus is on the border region of Croatia, called Eastern Slavonia, 
Baranja and Western Srijem. The region consists of two counties which differ in terms of 
local politics and electoral preferences. The first county is called Vukovar-Sirmium.  It 
suffered the most during the war in terms of the number of causalities and physical damage. 
For a substantial period of time during the conflict—at the time of the Republic of Serbian 
                                                 
4“Velika Hrvatska," or Great Croatia, is the ideology of modern Croatian ultra-nationalists, according to which 
Croatia should be only for Croats and its territory should unite all the lands that belonged to Croatia before 
Ottoman invasions of the 15th, 16th and 17th century. These territories include parts of modern Serbia, Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, and Montenegro (Vienna Profit, August 3 1992 in FBIS Daily Report (Eastern Europe), 
August 3, 1992. pp, 26-7). 
5 For example, HSP uses the symbols of the former Ustaše movement such as the letter "U" on the uniforms of 
its military wing. Ustaše was the Croatian Nazi movement in power during WWII. The war-time leader 
Dobroslav Paraga used to end his speeches with a Nazi salute (Hislope 1996). According to the Ignazi (1992) 
classification, HSP is an extreme right-wing party with roots in fascism. 
6 One of the regional political party, Croatian Democratic Alliance of Slavonija and Baranja (HDSSB, Hrvatski 
demokratski savez Slavonije i Baranje) may also be considered as moderately nationalistic as its leader, 
Branimir Glavaš, was one of the main defenders of the city of Osijek during the war. However, its main goals 
are in development of Osijek region and securing central budget transfers for it. The results are robust to 
characterising HDSSB as moderately nationalistic in addition to HDZ, the main party of power. 9 
 
Krajina, a Serbian entity self-proclaimed inside Croatia—all Croats in this part of the region 
were displaced. As a result, Croats living in this area are substantially more nationalistic than 
the national average. The second county is called Osijek-Baranja. It includes two subregions: 
Osijek and Baranja. Nationalistic sentiments are also important in Osijek, but are less wide-
spread than in Western Srijem and Eastern Slavonia. This subregion is the stronghold of 
HDSSB (Croatian Democratic Alliance of Slavonija and Baranja regional party). Unlike the 
rest of the border region, Baranja has a relatively large Hungarian minority (close to 30%) 
and, as a consequence, the population of Baranja shows relatively low support for Croatian 
nationalistic ideas. During the war, Baranja became occupied by Serbs almost without 
resistance. In the empirical analysis, we include county fixed effects and thus focus on the 
within-county variation. 
3. Hypotheses and the data 
Hypotheses. Our main hypothesis is that the exposure to Serbian public radio triggers 
nationalistic anti-Serbian feelings among Croats. There could be several potential belief-
based mechanisms underlying this hypothesis. First, Serbian radio may increase Croats’ 
awareness of Serbian nationalism in the past and remind them about the war (Zaller 1992). 
Second, listening to Serbian radio might increase the perceived probability among Croats of 
new war with Serbia in the future. Finally, Croats may believe that Serbian radio affects 
Serbs still living in Croatia, which, in turn, may increase the probability of a new civil war in 
Croatia.  
The main testable implication is that Croats exposed to Serbian radio are more likely 
to vote for Croatian extreme nationalist parties (i.e., HSP and its former factions, HCSP and 
HP-HPP). The literature on ultra-right party voting shows that fear is an important 
determinant of such behavior (Jackman and Volpert 1996, Voerman and Lucardie 1992, pp. 
48-49, and Westle and Niedermayer 1992, pp.  95-97).  
Which groups of voters are expected to move to the extreme nationalistic right as a 
result of Serbian radio exposure? There are two possibilities: those who abstain in the 
absence of Serbian radio and those who vote for less extreme parties. As it is easier to move 
to the ultra right from the moderate right rather than from any left-wing position on the scale 
of nationalistic political preference, we expect to see fewer people voting for the moderate 
nationalist party (HDZ) than for the neutral-toward-Serbs Social Democratic Party (SDP) as a 
result of Serbian radio exposure. The prediction about the effect of Serbian radio on Croatian 10 
 
turnout is ambiguous. On the one hand, it could increase due to a mobilization effect (as in 
DellaVigna and Kaplan 2007). On the other hand, it could decrease as people can get 
distracted from local policy issues (as in Snyder and Strömberg 2010).  
Furthermore, anti-Serbian feelings among Croats can be expressed in various ways 
other than voting for extreme-nationalistic parties. We test whether the likelihood of 
ethnically-offensive graffiti displayed on the walls of public buildings on the central streets of 
Croatian villages is higher in areas where Serbian public radio is available. 
Electoral measures. We use data from the 2007, the most recent election to the 
Croatian parliament. The Central Election Commission of Croatia published results at the 
level of polling stations. We match and aggregate these data to the village-level. The vast 
majority of villages include 1 to 4 polling stations, though some villages have more polling 
stations and some polling places cover several (typically small) villages. 
As we describe in the background section, we construct vote share measures for 
extreme nationalist parties (HSP, HP-HPP and HCSP), for moderate nationalist parties 
(HDZ) . and for parties without nationalistic ideology (SDP). Turnout is measured as the total 
votes cast divided by the number eligible voters. 
Ethnically-offensive graffiti. We visited all the villages in the main sample 
(described below) and collected information about the presence of ethnically-offensive 
graffiti on public buildings in the centers of villages. We classified graffiti as being ethnically 
offensive according to the methodology used by local NGO Globalpact in Vukovar in 2008. 
Representative examples of these graffiti are slogans as “Ubi Srbina” (“Kill a Serb”)
 or “Srbe 
na vrbe” (“Hang a Serb on a willow”) (Appendix Figure A1 presents an example). We 
generate an indicator variable for villages with graffiti which are “somewhat” or “strongly 
offensive” towards Serbs. Of the 138 villages we visited, 36 had ethnically-offensive graffiti. 
Control variables. Demographic control variables come from the most recent 
Croatian Census of 2001. We use the village level variables: logarithm of population, share of 
males, fractions of people between 21 and 40, between 41 and 60, and over 60 years of age. 
We also include controls at the level of municipality (općina), which typically includes 
several villages: labor force participation, share of population disabled after the War of 
independence, the shares of Croats and Serbs, and the share of people with higher education. 
In addition, we collected additional variables during our visits to the villages in 2009 
and 2010. Since the Census data on ethnic composition is noisy, as additional proxies we 
coded: (i) the language in which the street names are written – we use indicators for Cyrillic 11 
 
script and for Hungarian language and (ii) the type of beer predominantly sold in local bars, 
since people of Serbian, but not Croatian, origin prefer beer produced in Serbia (e.g., Jelen 
pivo) and vice versa - we constructed indicator variables for signs that advertised Serbian and 
Croatian beers outside village bars; (iii) an indicator for presence of official monuments in 
the honor of the Croatian defenders killed during the Serbo-Croatian war; (iv) an indicator for 
whether the village played an important role during the war, as coded by a former military 
official in charge of defending this region. 
To control for geographic location, we use the village elevation over the sea level and 
distance to Serbia; both variables are logged. The source for these variables is Google Earth. 
We also use hand-collected data on whether there is a large forest near the village from the 
Serbian side, since the existence of the forest hampers the signal of Serbian radio. Finally, we 
control for county fixed effects. This is only a rough geographic control, since the baseline 
sample consists of only two counties, Vukovar-Sirmium and Osijek-Baranja, with three 
additional counties, Slavonski Brod,  Virovitica-Podravina, and Požega-Slavonia in the 
extended sample. 
Sample. The region under study is located in the North-East of Croatia, bordering 
with Serbia to the East, Bosnia to the South, and Hungary to the North, as shown in Figure 
1a. The baseline sample includes 138 villages. In Figure 1a these villages are indicated by 
lighter dots. Figure 1b zooms into the region of the baseline sample and shows all the 
villages, as well as the radio reception measure (described below). The villages in the 
baseline sample are the ones which we were able to visit in person and, hence, in which we 
hand-collected radio reception data. 
The extended sample includes the baseline sample, but also adds villages in Eastern 
Slavonia, Baranja and Western Srijem which we were not able to visit, but for which we 
could compute the predicted radio reception (described below). These are all villages 
portrayed in Figure 1a. Figure 1c zooms in. This larger sample of 948 villages includes all the 
villages from counties of Osijek-Baranja and Vukovar-Sirmium which do not belong in the 
original sample, as well as all the villages from the counties of Slavonski Brod, Virovitica-
Podravina, and Požega-Slavonia. We exclude villages with no data on population or zero 
population. The summary statistics for all village-level variables are presented in Table A1. 12 
 
4. The Serbian radio in Croatia 
The long diffusion of radio waves implies that the main alternative to Croatian radio 
for the majority of population in the border region are Serbian and Bosnian radio stations 
broadcasting from the other side of the border. 
In Serbia, there are four public radio stations--RTS Radio 1, RTS Radio 2, RTS Radio 
3, and Radio Belgrade 202—as well as numerous private radio stations, like Radio Pink, 
Radio HIT, Radio S and the independent internationally sponsored Radio B92. RTS 1 
broadcasts mostly news and current affairs programs, RTS 2 is oriented to culture, and Radio 
Belgrade 202 is more youth-oriented and broadcasts music programs.  
With the exception of Radio B92, which was founded in 1989 with help of Soros 
foundation and USAID, all Serbian radio stations are pro Serbian government, in part 
because of a centralized license allocation process. In particular, Serbian public radios aim at 
reinforcing the Serbian national identity (IREX 2010). As part of its coverage, the public 
radio service broadcaster in Serbia has 9% of items covering neighboring countries 
(Nedeljkovic, Dubravka, and Bacanovic 2007, p. 214). Among the neighboring countries, 
Croatia is the most frequently covered; and the most covered topics are those related to war 
and war crimes (Nedeljkovic, Dubravka and Bacanovic 2007, 214).  
Given the political orientation and the nature of the coverage, it is not surprising that 
Croatian listeners can display a strong reaction to Serbian radio broadcast. The coverage of 
these topics is deemed controversial by Croatians listeners, bringing back recent memories of 
the war (Nedeljkovic, Dubravka, and Bacanovic 2007, p. 219 and Udovicic 2005, p. 21). In 
addition, even non-political broadcast can trigger ethnic animosity. For example, the most 
popular Serbian music style is the so-called turbo-folk, which was invented to support 
Milosevic rule, and is considered offensive by Croats and Bosnians as it is associated with 
glorifying the war by Serbs (Kronja 2004). 
Radio signal availability. Our identification strategy is based on comparing villages 
near the border in Croatia which receive Serbian radio to those which do not. To construct 
our measure of radio reception in the baseline sample of 138 villages, we traveled with a 
radio receiver throughout this region in June 2009 and June 2010.
 In the center of each village 
(near the church or the war monument), we used a portable radio receiver to test whether the 
RTS Serbian stations were available. We count a radio station as available if its quality was 
good enough to listen to it (based on subjective assessment of two people who made a 
judgment about whether the signal is good enough to hear well and understand what is being 13 
 
said).
 In our analysis, we use two measures of availability of Serbian radios: (1) a dummy for 
at least one RTS radio station available, and (2) a dummy for at least two RTS radio stations 
available. Figure 1b displays with a “+” sign the villages with reception of at least one Serbia 
radio according to this measure. 
An important caveat is that the radio signal measures were taken in 2009 and 2010, 
whereas the election data are from 2007. Thus, our analysis is valid under the assumption that 
the radio reception did not change much in this period. We believe that this assumption is 
reasonable. The transmitter system of Serbian and Croatian radios was built during the times 
of Socialist Yugoslavia. Transmitters used by Serbian RTS radio stations are located in 
Serbia. During the war some of these transmitters were damaged, but the vast majority was 
repaired by the beginning of 2000s and was left largely unchanged since. In particular, 
transmitters, both Serbian and Croatian, remained the same in 2007-2010. 
The measurement of radio signal above defines our baseline sample of 138 villages. 
To extend the analysis to an extended sample of 948 villages, we also collected data on the 
location of RTS transmitters from the RTS website supplemented with data on the technical 
characteristics of these transmitters from fmscan.org. We used this data to construct the 
predicted availability of RTS Serbian radios. 
To do so, we first determine the power of the RTS signal for each of the Serbian 
villages. Similarly to Olken (2009) and Enikolopov et al. (forthcoming), we apply the 
Irregular Terrain Model (Hufford 2002) to calculate the signal loss caused by physical 
distance and topography between transmitting and receiving locations. The model allows us 
to calculate the signal power for each village-transmitter pair using the geographical center of 
each village as the receiving location. Our measure of the signal strength for each village and 
each radio is the maximum of the signal powers across all transmitters.  
Second, we estimate the relationship between the probability that a village in fact had 
radio reception of at least one RTS radio according to our hand-collected measure and radio 
signal strength with a probit regression. We estimate a probit with the maximum signal 
strength of all RTS radios as an independent variable, together with Osijek-Baranjai a 
dummy for village i being a part of Osijek-Baranja county: 
 
Using these equations, we predict the probability that RTS radio(s) are available in 
and out of sample. Figure 1b displays the predicted probability of reception in the baseline 
villages; the predicted measure and the actual measure line up quite nicely, though the 14 
 
overlap is far from complete. Figure 1c shows the predicted availability in the extended 
sample; clearly the availability declines with the distance from the Serbian border, though it 
does so in a jagged way. 
In the analysis of the effect of RTS on voting outcomes we use both the actual 
measure of radio reception, as well as the predicted measure. In particular, we use the 
predicted probability as the measure of RTS availability rather than using a nonlinear 
function of the signal strength to allow for meaningful interpretation of the size of the 
estimated coefficients. 
Survey. These measures of radio availability provide us with variation in whether 
Croatian villagers are able to listen to Serbian radio. These measures, however, do not 
address the key question whether the villagers where Serbian radio is indeed available 
actually listen to the cross-border radio. If they do not, comparing towns with and without 
radio availability is a pointless exercise. 
To answer this question, in December 2010 and January 2011 we conducted a face-to-
face survey of 70 individuals in 9 villages in the baseline sample: 4 villages without Serbian 
radio access (according to our measures), 2 villages with access to one Serbian radio, and 3 
villages with access to two Serbian radios. We asked people on the central street of each 
village whether they could answer a few questions. The response rate was about 50%. The 
questionnaire and a more detailed description of the survey are given in the Appendix. 
A first question we asked respondents is whether Serbian radio is available in their 
village. As Figure 2a shows, 87 percent of the respondents in villages which we categorize as 
having at least one Serbian radio respond affirmatively to the question, compared to 56 
percent in villages which we categorize as having no reception. 7 
The second question was how often they listen to Serbian radio. In the villages with at 
least one Serbian radio station (according to our classification), 74 percent of the respondents 
state that they listen to Serbian radio at least rarely, and 32 percent state that they listen to 
Serbian radio at least once per week. By comparison, in the villages which we code as not 
having Serbian radio, 38 percent of respondents state that they listen to Serbian radio at least 
rarely, and 16 percent state that they do so at least once per week. As shown in Table 1, 
                                                 
7 There are several potential explanations for the stated availability of Serbia radio in villages which we classify 
as not having such availability. First, our measure is crude and radio receivers differ in their power. We used a 
portable receiver without an amplifier, whereas amplifiers are fairly common. Second, there might be within 
village variation in the availability of weak signal. Third, there are different Serbian radios, broadcasted from 
different places, and the absence of the availability of RTS radios does not mean there is no Serbian radio in the 
village. Unfortunately, people do not remember the names of radios, so we could not ask specifically about RTS 
radio. 15 
 
estimation of a linear probability model indicates that there is a statistically significant 
difference between the likelihood of listening to Serbian radios at least rarely according to 
survey responses between villages with at least one Serbian radio available and villages 
without Serbian radio (according to our measure). We obtain a similar, but not statistically 
significant, result on an indicator for listening to Serbian radio often. 
The findings go in the same direction when we use the answer to the question whether 
respondents know the songs of a popular Serbian group whose music is only played on 
Serbian radios. Importantly, in contrast to the results about Serbian radios, there is no 
difference between responses about the likelihood of listening to Bosnian and Hungarian 
radios between villages which we coded as those with and without Serbian radio signal. Thus, 
although Bosnian and Hungarian radios are also available in some areas in our region, their 
availability is presumably orthogonal to the availability of Serbian radios. Since we do not 
have information about the location of the Bosnian and Hungarian transmitters, we cannot 
control for the signal of Bosnian and Hungarian radios directly. 
Overall, the survey findings indicate that a significant share of respondents listen to 
Serbian radio. In addition, the survey provides a reality check on our hand-collected radio 
availability measure and shows that our measure correlates well with survey measures of both 
the availability and listenership of Serbian radios. 
5. Empirical results on nationalism 
Determinants of radio availability. Our main empirical specifications relates the 
reception of Serbian radios, both measured and predicted, to voting for nationalist parties and 
to the presence of ethnically offensive graffiti. Before we proceed to these specifications, we 
first document the extent to which the availability of Serbian radios in the different villages 
correlates with control variables which may also be related to nationalistic sentiment. 
Column 1 in Table 2 shows that only the share of people with higher education and 
the share of people above 60 have a statistically significant effect on the measured reception 
of Serbian radio in the villages in the baseline sample. The relationship is not strong and, as 
reported at the bottom of the Table, the controls are not jointly significant. The availability of 
Serbian radio, hence, is not strongly related to the demographic variables. 
In contrast, as shown in Column 2, the hand-collected measure of Serbian radio 
availability is, as expected, strongly correlated with the signal strength of the Serbian radio, 
constructed using transmitter information. This correlation replicates the pattern in Figure 1b 16 
 
showing a clear correlation between the measured availability in the village (indicated with a 
“+” sign) and the predicted signal strength in deciles (indicated by the size of the circles).  
Columns 3 and 4 show the determinants of predicted reception of Serbian radio 
which, as we discussed in the previous Section, reflects the strength of the radio signal. This 
measure is related (negatively) to the distance to Serbia, to the share of people between 41 
and 60 years of age (also negatively), and to the number of individuals disabled in the war of 
independence. In the specifications below we examine how the estimates change after 
controlling for these variables. 
Effect on voting for the extreme nationalist parties. To test whether Serbian radio 
affects voting behavior, we estimate the following OLS regression:  
dep_var i = β0 +β1⋅Availability_of _RTS_radioi +β2Xi +ϕr +εi     (1) 
where dep_vari is the relevant political variable (vote share or turnout) in village i for the 
2007 Parliamentary (Sabor)  elections,  Availability_of _RTS_radioi is the measure of 
availability of Serbian radio stations, i.e., either an indicator variable for the measured 
availability or predicted availability based on signal strength, Xi is a vector of 
socioeconomic and demographic controls, and  ϕr are county fixed effects. We weight the 
observations by the  population of the village and cluster the standard errors at the 
municipality (Opstina) level. 
Table 3 presents the results of estimation of equation (1) for the vote share of 
extremely nationalistic parties (HSP, HCSP, and HP-HPP) in the baseline sample of villages. 
The first four columns show the results with no controls (Column 1), geographic controls 
only (Column 2), geographic and Census demographic controls (Column 3), and all controls 
(Column 4). In the specification with most controls (Column 4), we estimate that the 
availability of Serbian radio increases the vote share for the extreme nationalist parties by 2.3 
percentage points relative to a baseline vote share of 7 percentage points, a statistically and 
economically significant effect. 
A key potential problem with this specification is that the availability of Serbian radio 
could proxy for (unobservable) confounding variables which are positively correlated with 
nationalistic sentiment and hence bias upward the correlation between radio availability and 
nationalistic vote share. While we have shown above that there is no significant correlation 
with observables of the radio availability variable (Table 3), a second way to address this 
concern is to examine how the introduction of control variables affects the results. To the 
extent that the observable controls are positively correlated with the unobservable confounds, 17 
 
if there is an upward bias in the estimates due to an omitted variable, adding controls should 
lower the point estimate, since they reduce the impact of the bias on the estimates of the key 
variable. This is the test which Altonji, Elder, and Taber (2005) propose to examine the 
impact of potentially biasing unobservables. When we apply this test to our results, we find 
no evidence that a bias drives the results upward. The point estimate of the effect of radio 
increases monotonically with the addition of controls (except in the last Column where it 
remains essentially constant), indicating that the estimates of the impact of radio, if anything, 
are likely to be biased downward, that is, against finding a positive effect of radio on 
nationalistic voting. While of course it is possible that our control variables are not positively 
correlated with the unobservables which bias the results, the controls do a good job of 
predicting the nationalistic vote share, with an R-squared of 0.53 (Column 4). The Altonji-
Elder-Taber test is particularly stringent when the controls capture a sizeable amount of the 
variation in the dependent variable, as in this case. Another interesting pattern in the OLS 
results reported in Columns 1-4 in Table 3 is that, as the controls are added, the standard error 
for the estimated effect of radio decreases. The extra controls lower the residual error in 
voting more than they take away predictive power in the radio availability variable. 
One may worry that the estimated effect of exposure to Serbian radio reflects the 
impact of an outlier village, especially given the small sample of 138 villages in the baseline 
sample, of which 15 villages are identified as having reception of Serbian radios. To address 
this concern, we compare the c.d.f. of the vote share for the extreme nationalistic party in the 
villages with and without reception of Serbian radio. Figure 3a provides the simple 
comparison of the c.d.f,s for the two groups of villages, and Figure 3b provides a comparison 
of the c.d.f. after taking control variables into account. (We regress the vote share on all the 
control variables in Column 4 except the radio reception, and plot the residuals evaluated at 
the mean). In both figures, the vote share for the villages with Serbian radio essentially first 
order stochastically dominates the vote share for villages with no Serbian radio. The pattern 
is particularly clear with control variables. A Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, indeed, rejects the 
hypothesis of the equality of distributions with controls (Figure 3b, p-value of 0.009), though 
it does not reject the equality of distributions without controls (Figure 3a, p-value of 0.364).  
Figure 3c provides a similar graphical comparison showing on the map the residual 
vote share for the extreme nationalist parties (in deciles) after accounting for controls and the 
availability of Serbian radio. The towns with Serbian radios are indeed some of the towns 
with larger nationalistic vote share, though the correspondence is not perfect. Both the c.d.f. 
comparison and the map evidence show that the results are not due to a single outlier but 18 
 
rather to a pronounced pattern. 
Returning to Table 3, the next specification (Column 5) decomposes the effect of 
availability of one Serbian radio versus multiple Serbian radios. In the 9 villages where 
multiple (RTS) Serbian radios are available the audience is more likely to listen to Serbian 
content (intentionally or accidentally), and the reception of the Serbian channels is likely to 
be better. We find that indeed the villages with two radios are associated with a larger impact 
on nationalistic voting than the villages with one radio, a difference which is marginally 
statistically significant. 
The estimates so far have made use of the measure of Serbian radio availability which 
we recorded ourselves on a field trip to each village. This measure is likely to display 
significant measurement error since radio availability may vary with different times of day or 
different weather. To obviate this problem, we present two alternative specifications. In 
Column 6, we instrument the indicator for measured radio availability with the signal strength 
variable of Serbian radios described in the previous Section. The first stage is relatively 
strong, with an F-stat of 8.02. The instrumented radio availability is associated with a larger 
and statistically significant effect on the nationalistic vote share. We obtain a similar result in 
Column 7 where we use the predicted availability measure. 
In Figure 4 we provide a graphical display of the findings using predicted availability. 
We plot the average vote share for extreme nationalist parties plotted for each decile of the 
distribution of predicted reception of RTS radio. The vote share variable is the residual of a 
regression on the standard controls. The figure suggests a clearly monotonic pattern between 
the vote share and predicted availability, consistent with the findings in the Table. 
Overall, our results suggest that the cross-border media effects are quite large. We 
interpret the magnitudes below in a subsection on persuasion rates. This subsection also 
discusses the potential concern that the estimated IV effects might be too large. 
Other voting outcomes. In Table 4 we provide evidence on other political outcomes 
using two key specifications: an OLS specification using measured radio availability with all 
controls, as in Column 4 of Table 3, and an OLS specification with predicted radio 
availability, as in Column 7 of Table 3. The Table also reproduces in Column 1 and 2 the 
estimates from Table 3 on the vote share of extreme nationalist parties. 
The availability of Serbian radio appears to have had a negative effect on the vote 
share for the moderate nationalistic parties (Columns 3 and 4), especially in the specification 
with predicted availability. There is no significant effect on the vote share for the Social 
Democratic party (Columns 5 and 6). An interpretation of this result is that exposure to 19 
 
Serbian radio made Croatian voters more nationalistic at the margin, shifting some voters 
from political support of the moderate nationalist party to the support for the extreme 
nationalist parties. In contrast, voters that were on a different side of the spectrum, i.e., the 
voters for the Social Democratic party,  were not affected. 
Columns 7 and 8 present some weak evidence, in the specification with predicted 
availability, that exposure to Serbian radio may have increased turnout, although the effect is 
not significant. Unfortunately, the analysis of turnout is tentative, as the measure of voters 
listed used as denominator is quite noisy. 
Extended sample analysis. The analysis so far focused on the sub-sample of villages 
closest to the border which we visited (baseline sample). In the next set of results, we analyze 
the extended sample of 948 villages. In this larger sample, we do not have a direct measure of 
radio availability and hence we focus on the specification with predicted availability for 
comparability with specification in Column 7 in the baseline sample. We report the results 
both with and without controls to document the importance of selection on observables. 
The results are largely robust to extending the sample as reported in Table 5. The 
predicted availability of a Serbian radio is associated with significantly higher vote share for 
the extreme nationalist parties (Columns 1 and 2), a decrease in the vote share for moderate 
nationalist parties once controls are in place (Columns 3 and 4), no impact on the vote share 
for the social-democratic party (Columns 5 and 6), and no effect on turnout (Column 7 and 
8). Regarding the main result on the vote share of extreme nationalist parties, again the 
estimate with controls is (somewhat) larger than the estimate without controls, suggesting 
that potential omitted variables are not likely to bias the estimates in our favor. 
Effect on graffiti. We focused so far on the expressions of nationalism via election 
outcomes. Nationalism may however express itself in several other forms, one of which we 
set out to measure with the presence of graffiti, which are ethnically disparaging of Serbs, in 
public spaces in the village. Table 6 reports the results of estimate of a linear probability 
model for the probability of having ethnically-offensive graffiti. We find that in villages with 
Serbian radio, the probability of finding ethnically offensive graffiti in the streets is 25 
percentage points larger, that is, it nearly doubles, as compared to the villages with no 
Serbian radio. This effect is marginally significant in the specification with all controls 
(Column 4), and not significant in the instrumented specification (Column 6) and in the 
specification with predicted availability (Column 7). Unlike in the evidence on voting, adding 
additional controls lowers the effect (Columns 1 through 4), suggesting the potential biasing 
role of unobservables. Overall, the results provide suggestive evidence that Serbian public 20 
 
radio increases the expressions of Croatian nationalism beyond the voting booths. 
Persuasion rates. To interpret the magnitudes of the impact of media availability on 
voting for extreme nationalist parties, we evaluate the results in terms of a measure proposed 
by DellaVigna and Kaplan (2007), the persuasion rate, which provides an intuitive 
quantitative interpretation of the results. The persuasion rate is the fraction of the audience of 
a media outlet who are convinced to change their behavior (in this case, their vote) as a result 
of being exposed to this media outlet.  
To compute the persuasion rates, one needs an estimate of the share of individuals 
listening to the media in question (Serbian radio in our case) in the treatment group (villages 
with Serbian radio) and in the control groups (villages without Serbian radio). As not all 
residents in a village with reception of Serbian radio listen to it and not all residents in 
villages with no reception of Serbian radio (according to our measure) do not listen to it, we 
use survey responses to provide information on the “first stage.” The estimates in Table 1 
imply that the exposure to Serbia radio content is 31 percentage points higher in the villages 
with at least one Serbian radio available (Column 2 of Table 1). In addition, a 10% increase 
in the predicted availability of Serbian radio is associated with a 25-percentage point increase 
in exposure (Column 3 of Table 1). 
To compute a persuasion rate based on the dichotomous measure of availability of 






. ν T and ν C are the votes for ultra-nationalists in villages with and 
without Serbian radio, respectively. eT  and eC are the exposures to Serbian radio in villages 
with and without Serbian radio, respectively. And tT is the turnout in villages with Serbian 
radio. Turnout is not affected by Serbian radio and is equal to tT =t =55%. The difference in 
exposure is estimated from the survey data and equals to  ˆ eT−ˆ e C=0.313 (Column 2 of Table 
1). The impact on voting equals  ˆ ν T− ˆ ν C= 0.0226 (Column 4 of Table 3) and the predicted 
share of vote for ultra-nationalists in the absence of Serbian radio is  ˆ ν C= 0.057. Thus, the 
persuasion rate is  f =(0.0226*0.562)/(0.313*0.943)= 4.3%. 
Alternatively, we can compute a persuasion rate based on the continuous measure of 
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Here  ν 0t0 is the number of people who would vote for ultra-nationalists in the 
absence of Serbian radio; ν and t are the vote share of ultra-nationalists and the voter turnout 
in Opštinas with e exposure to the Serbian public radio;  dν
da
 is the effect of da change in 
predicted availability on the vote share;  de
da
 is the effect of a da change in predicted 
availability on the exposure; and   dt
de
 is the effect of de change in exposure on the turnout.  
Our results with the predicted radio availability yield that ν 0t0 equals 3.9 percent. This 
implies that 97.8 percent of Croats could, in principle, be convinced by the radio’s message. 
From column 7 of Table 3, we get that  dν
da
 is equal to 0.183. The estimate of the effect of 
predicted radio availability on the exposure  de
da
 is 2.534 (Column 3 of Table 1). As there is 
no effect on turnout, the second term in the parentheses in equation (3) is 0, as t does not 
depend on e. Thus, the persuasion rate implied by these calculations is f =4.2%. These results 
are very similar to the results obtained using a binary measure of radio availability above and 
comparable with the other results in the literature (DellaVigna and Gentzkow 2010). 
6. Laboratory Experiment 
To provide additional evidence on the causal effect of Serbian radio on the 
nationalistic sentiment of Croats, we designed a laboratory experiment in which we exposed 
Croatian students from the region to different remixes of news and music from radio 
programs typically broadcasted in the region. The experiment took place in December 2011 
with 80 undergraduate Croatian students from the University of Vukovar as subjects.  
We randomized the students into three groups and put them in three different 
classrooms. Each group listened to a 17 minute remix of radio recordings with some common 
parts drawn from a Croatian radio station and other parts depending on group assignment. 
The first group listened to fragments from Croatian radio; the second group listened to 
fragments from the RTS Serbian public radio; and the third group listened fragments from the 22 
 
independent Serbian radio B92 (which is substantially less nationalistic compared to RTS). 
The recording also included two songs (each about two minutes long each), which were 
chosen to be representative of the songs that could be heard on Croatian radio stations, RTS 
radio, and B92 radio, respectively (see Appendix Table A2 for further details). 
After listening to the remixes, subjects were given five minutes to complete a 
questionnaire which asked about basic socio-demographic information of the respondent, 
content of the remix they were subjected to, and, most importantly, a number of questions 
that elicit attitudes toward different ethnic groups. Overall, the experiment took about 30 
minutes. For participating in the experiment each subject received 20 kunas (slightly less than 
$4, equal to approximately an hourly wage of the subjects). 
This design is modeled upon the work of, among others, Iyengar (1995), who used it 
to study the impact of political advertising on political attitudes. The downside of this design 
is that the outcomes are survey responses which can be subject to a demand effect, with the 
subject confirming to expectations about the desired findings of the study. The advantage, 
compared to the field evidence, is that we can guarantee random assignment of information 
and examine the consistency of experimental results with the field evidence. 
We elicited attitudes towards other ethnic groups, i.e., Serbs, Bosnians, Hungarians, 
and Rusini. The first question was a “feeling thermometer” which asks to express the 
subject’s attitude towards each ethnic group, on a scale from 0 to 100. The second question 
asked whether respondents would agree to work with someone of each ethnic group. As 
Figures 5a and 5b show, exposure to Serbian radio had a dramatic effect of inducing less 
positive attitudes towards Serbs, and reducing substantially the likelihood to work with a 
Serbian person. This effect is more pronounced for the exposure to the RTS radio, which is 
the focus of our paper, compared to the exposure to the less-nationalistic B92 radio. There is 
no effect on attitudes towards other ethnic groups, as expected. 
This finding suggests that even short exposure to the type of content featured in the 
Serbian RTS radio affects significantly attitudes towards Serbs in the direction of increased 
nationalism and anti-Serbian sentiment (for example, lowering the willingness to work 
together with them). We find similar patterns in the other questions designed to measure 
ethnic preferences. These findings strongly support the results from the field. 
We also asked subjects to rank political parties with lower rank indicating higher 
preference. As Figure 5c shows, we find a modest (not statistically significant) reduction in 
the rank for the extreme nationalist party, a significant reduction in the rank for the moderate 
nationalist parties, and an increase in the rank of the Social Democratic party. These results 23 
 
also indicate that the general nationalistic sentiment goes up with the exposure to Serbian 
radio which is consistent with our other findings. The larger effect on moderate nationalist 
parties, however, differs from the results based on election data.   
Overall, subjects treated with Serbian nationalistic public radio, RTS, which is openly 
hostile to Croatia, were substantially more affected by the treatment compared to those 
treated with B92, Serbian radio neutral towards Croats. This evidence sheds some light on the 
mechanism behind the effect. It is more likely that Serbian public radio catalyses ethnic 
animosity towards Serbs among Croats because it reminds Croats specifically about current 
Serbian nationalism and anti-Croatian rhetoric rather than because it reminds them that their 
former war enemy is located nearby (on the other side of the border). 
7. Conclusion 
This paper documents the effect of Serbian public radio on the voting behavior and 
nationalistic anti-Serbian sentiment of Croats in Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western 
Srijem, a post-conflict region of modern Croatia on the border with Serbia. We find that the 
exposure to the Serbian public radio convinces some Croats to switch to voting for ultra-
nationalist parties from voting to moderate nationalist party. In addition, there is some 
evidence that Serbian public radio increases the incidence of ethnically-offensive graffiti on 
public buildings in the center of their villages. The results of a laboratory experiment confirm 
that Serbian public radio causes an increase in anti-Serbian sentiment among Croats.  
Our results suggest that foreign media can have substantial cross-border effects in 
countries characterized by post-conflict ethnic tensions such as Croatia. Further research is 
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Figure 2a. Reported reception of Serbian radio (survey response), as 
function of availability of Serbian radio in village. 
 
Figure 2b. Reported frequency of listening to Serbian radio (survey 
response), as function of availability of Serbian radio in village 
 
Notes: Figures 2a and 2b tabulate the responses to two questions of an in-person survey 
undertaken in Dec. 2010 and Jan. 2011 in 9 of the Croatian villages in the baseline 
sample. We report the average responses separately for the 32 respondents in villages 
which we code as not having reception of Serbian radio, and for the 38 respondents in 
villages which we code as having reception of at least one Serbian radio. 30 
 
Figure 3. Vote share for extreme nationalistic parties in villages with, and 
without, reception of Serbian radio (no controls) 
 
 
Figure 3b. Vote share for extreme nationalistic parties in villages with, and 
without, reception of Serbian radio (controls). 
 

















   32 
 
Figure 4. Vote share of extremely nationalistic parties as function of 
predicted availability of Serbian radio in village (controls, baseline 
sample). 
 
Notes: The picture shows mean share of votes for HSP et al. and mean predicted 
availability of Serbian radio after taking controls into account. The means are taken by 
deciles of the predicted availability of Serbian radio. Residuals are taken from the 
specification presented in column (3) of Table 3.  
 33 
 
Figure 5a. Feeling thermometer toward people of different ethnic groups 
(Laboratory Experiment) 
 
Notes: Difference between control and RTS treatment for feeling towards Serbs is 
significant at 1% level. All other differences are not significant.  
 
Figure 5b. Disagreeing to work with people from different ethnic groups 
(Laboratory Experiment) 
 
Notes: Differences between control and both treatments for Serbs are significant at 
1% level. For all the other ethnic groups, the difference is not significant. 34 
 
Figure 5c. Average rank of parties (Laboratory Experiment) 
 
Note: Difference between control and RTS treatment for moderate nationalists is 
significant at 5% level. The difference between control and RTS treatment for social 




(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
0.362*** 0.313* 0.16 0.144
[0.089] [0.139] [0.110] [0.111]
2.534** 1.462
[0.992] [0.904]
Constant 4.188*** 3.924*** 5.302***
[0.217] [0.308] [0.751]
Controls No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Observations 70 70 70 70 70 70
R-squared 0.13 0.45 0.42 0.03 0.28 0.27
Effect of 1 st. dev. change 0.119 0.069
Table 1. Effect of Serbian radio availability on radio listenership: Survey Evidence
Predicted availability of at 
least 1 Serbian radio
Notes: Data from a survey of 70 individuals in 9 villages. Respondents are asked how often, if at all, they listen to Serbian radio. They are considered to 
listen to Serbian radio often if they listen to it at least several times per week. Control variables include age, gender, occupation, education, and whether 
village was surveyed in 2011. Robust standard errors adjusted for clusters by villages in brackets * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant 
at 1%
Indicator for Survey Respondent Who Reports Listening to Serbian Radio
At least rarely Often
At least 1 Serbian radio 
available36 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Maximum signal strength of all Serbian 
RTS radios 0.00881**
[0.00358]
Distance to Serbia, logged -0.0552 -0.0218 -0.0740*** -0.0468***
[0.0339] [0.0318] [0.0194] [0.0110]
Population (logged) -0.034 -0.0416 0.00856 -0.000137
[0.0307] [0.0333] [0.00647] [0.000815]
% of Croats -0.169 -0.0391 -0.105 0.0194
[0.223] [0.188] [0.0662] [0.0293]
% of people with higher education 3.659** 2.740** 0.523 -0.0416
[1.487] [1.260] [0.436] [0.135]
% of male population -1.419 -1.676 -0.137 -0.0152
[1.137] [1.193] [0.213] [0.0120]
Economically active population (%) -0.252 -0.223 0.0336 0.0398
[0.910] [0.931] [0.364] [0.0384]
% of aged 21-40 -2.311 -2.388 -0.121 -0.0215
[1.780] [1.980] [0.363] [0.0173]
% of aged 41-60 -1.594 -0.982 -0.610** -0.0394**
[1.134] [1.101] [0.298] [0.0174]
% of aged 61+ -1.477* -1.217 -0.274 -0.0187
[0.846] [0.893] [0.208] [0.0117]
-1.032 -3.835 2.933*** 1.231***
[2.380] [2.944] [1.068] [0.374]
Large forest nearby -0.114 -0.118* -0.0274
[0.0684] [0.0640] [0.0262]
Region fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Additional controls Yes Yes Yes No
Sample Baseline Baseline Baseline Extended
Observations 138 138 138 948
R-squared 0.16 0.20 0.55 0.67
F-stat for controls 1.25 1.30 6.73*** 5.41***
Disabled after the war of independence  
(%)
Table 2. Determinants of the availability of Serbian radio
Notes: Additional control variables include dummy variables for monument in the honor of died defendants of the town, names of the streets in 
Cyrillic script, names of the streets in Hungarian, Serbian beer in bars.F-stat for the test that all the variables except for signal strength and the 
large forest nearby are not significant. The standard errors in brackets are clustered by mjnicipality, allowing for correlation between villages in the 
same mjnicipality. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Indicator for measured Availability of 
at least 1 Serbian (RTS) radio
Predicted Availability of at least 1 




OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS IV OLS
( 1 )( 2 )( 3 )( 4 )( 5 )( 6 )( 7 )
0.006 0.022* 0.024** 0.023** 0.006 0.170**





Distance to Serbia, logged -0.005 -0.012 -0.011 -0.01 0.003 0.004
[0.008] [0.007] [0.010] [0.010] [0.011] [0.010]
Region fixed effects No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Census controls No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Additional controls No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mean of Dependent Variable 0.070 0.070 0.070 0.070 0.070 0.070 0.070
R-squared 0 . 0 0 1 0 . 2 90 . 5 20 . 5 30 . 5 40 . 1 00 . 5 7
Observations 138 138 138 138 138 138 138
Implied Persuasion Rates 0.012 0.042 0.047 0.043 0.012 0.318 0.041
F-stat for instruments 7.13
Effect of 1 st. dev. change 0.02
Notes: The specification report the results of OLS and IV specifications, with the observations weighed by village population. This baseline sample includes villages 
directly visited by the authors in 2009 and 2010 to measure the radio availability in the main street. The instrument for radio availability in Column 6 is the maximum 
signal strength of Serbian RTS radios. The variable "Predicted availability" (Column 7) is estimated from a probit regression of measured availability on the computed 
maximum signal strength of Serbian RTS radios. The full set of control variables is listed in Appendix Table A1. The standard errors in brackets are clustered by 
mjnicipality, allowing for correlation between villages in the same mjnicipality. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Table 3. Serbian radio and vote for extreme nationalists. Baseline sample.
Vote share for extremely nationalistic parties
At least 1 Serbian (RTS) 
radio available
At least 2 Serbian (RTS) 
radios available
Predicted availability of at 
least 1 Serbian (RTS) radio38 
 
 
( 1 )( 2 )( 3 )( 4 )( 5 )( 6 )( 7 )( 8 )
0.023** -0.036 0.009 -0.002
[0.009] [0.024] [0.020] [0.023]
0.183*** -0.200*** 0.056 0.052
[0.041] [0.064] [0.062] [0.070]
Region fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Census and geographic 
controls
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Manually collected controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mean of Dependent Variable 0.070 0.070 0.362 0.362 0.251 0.251 0.550 0.550
R-squared 0.53 0.57 0.78 0.78 0.78 0.78 0.58 0.58
Observations 138 138 138 138 138 138 138 138
Implied Persuasion rates 0.04 0.04 -0.11 -0.06 0.02 0.01 -0.01 0.02
Effect of 1 st. dev. change 0.02 -0.02 0.006 0.005
Table 4. Serbian radio, vote for other parties and turnout. Baseline sample.
Vote Share of  Vote Share of  Turnout
At least 1 Serbian (RTS) 
radio available
Predicted availability of at 
least 1 Serbian (RTS) radio
Notes: The specification report the results of OLS and IV specifications, with the observations weighed by village population. This baseline sample includes villages 
directly visited by the authors in 2009 and 2010 to measure the radio availability in the main street. The instrument for radio availability in Column 6 is the maximum 
signal strength of Serbian RTS radios. The variable "Predicted availability" (Column 7) is estimated from a probit regression of measured availability on the computed 
maximum signal strength of Serbian RTS radios. The full set of control variables is listed in Appendix Table A1. The standard errors in brackets are clustered by 
municipality, allowing for correlation between villages in the same municipality. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Vote Share of 
Extreme Nationalists Moderate Nationalists Social-Democrats39 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
0.111** 0.126** 0.034 -0.171* -0.086 0.096 -0.125 -0.033
[0.053] [0.051] [0.121] [0.097] [0.107] [0.105] [0.119] [0.137]
Region fixed effects No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Census and 
geographic controls
No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Mean of Dependent 
Variable 0.054 0.054 0.384 0.384 0.252 0.252 0.592 0.592
R - s q u a r e d 0 . 0 3 2 0 . 3 00 . 0 00 . 5 30 . 0 00 . 5 60 . 0 20 . 2 8
Observations 948 948 948 948 948 948 948 948
Effect of 1 st. dev. 
change
0.006 0.007 0.002 -0.010 -0.005 0.006 -0.007 -0.0019
Persuasion rates 0.03 0.03 0.01 -0.05 -0.03 0.03 -0.07 -0.01
Predicted availability 
of at least 1 Serbian 
(RTS) radio
Notes: The specification report the results of OLS specifications, with the observations weighed by village population. This extended sample includes villages in the 
broader Croatian region not directly visited by the authors. The variable "Predicted availability" (Columns 2, 4, 6, 8) is estimated from a probit regression of 
measured availability on the computed maximum signal strength of Serbian RTS radios. The full set of control variables is listed in Appendix Table A1. The standard 
errors in brackets are clustered by municipality, allowing for correlation between villages in the same municipality. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** 
significant at 1%
Table 5. Extended sample results.





OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS IV OLS
( 1 )( 2 )( 3 )( 4 )( 5 )( 6 )( 7 )
0.373*** 0.283** 0.269** 0.250* 0.188 0.509





Region fixed effects No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Distance to Serbia, logged No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Census and geographic 
controls
No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Additional controls No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mean of Dependent Variable
0.26 0.26 0.26 0.26 0.26 0.26 0.26
R-squared 0.07 0.19 0.24 0.28 0.28 0.25 0.25
Observations 138 138 138 138 138 138 138
χ
2-stat for instruments 8.07
Notes: The specification report the results of OLS and IV specifications, with the observations weighed by village population. This baseline sample includes villages 
directly visited by the authors in 2009 and 2010 to measure the radio availability in the main street. The dependent variable is an indicator for the presence of a graffiti 
offensive towards Serbs in the village streets, as measured on an in-person visit in 2009 and 2010. The instrument for radio availability in Column 6 is the maximum 
signal strength of Serbian RTS radios. The variable "Predicted availability" (Column 7) is estimated from a probit regression of measured availability on the computed 
maximum signal strength of Serbian RTS radios. The full set of control variables is listed in Appendix Table A1. The standard errors in brackets are clustered by 
municipality, allowing for correlation between villages in the same municipality. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Table 6. Serbian radio and ethnically offensive graffiti.
Indicator for ethnically offensive graffiti in a village
At least 1 Serbian (RTS) 
radio available
At least 2 Serbian (RTS) 
radios available
Predicted availability of at 















Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Radio Availability Measures
At least 1 RTS radio available 0.10 0.30
At least 2 RTS radios available 0.06 0.23
Predicted availability of at least 1 RTS radio 0.11 0.11 0.05 0.08
Predicted availability of at least 2 RTS radios 0.07 0.14 0.02 0.08
Vote share of extreme nationalistic party 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.05
Vote share of moderate nationalistic party 0.40 0.14 0.38 0.12
Vote share of social-democratic party 0.26 0.13 0.27 0.11
Turnout 0.56 0.09 0.59 0.08
Ethnically offensive graffiti 0.42 0.50
Census Controls
Population 8305 10846 10015 16246
% of Croats 75.05 27.21 86.55 17.88
Disabled after the war of independence  0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01
Economically active population  0.41 0.03 0.41 0.03
People with higher education (%) 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.03
Male (%) 0.48 0.01 0.49 0.02
People aged 21-40 (%) 0.27 0.02 0.27 0.03
People of aged 41-60 (%) 0.26 0.03 0.25 0.03
People of aged 61+ (%) 0.21 0.04 0.21 0.05
Geographic Controls
Distance to Serbia 16.20 8.96 59.33 38.86
Large forest nearby 0.23 0.42 0.23 0.42
Additional Controls
Monument in honor of defendants of the town 0.64 0.48
Names of the streets in Cyrillic script 0.09 0.29
Names of the streets in Hungarian 0.03 0.17
Serbian beer in bars 0.08 0.26
Was important during the war 0.26 0.44
Number of observations
Appendix Table A1. Summary Statistics
Dependent Variables
Notes: List of all the control variables for the baseline sample of villages (first two columns) and for the extended 
sample (next two columns).
138 948
Baseline Sample Extended Sample43 
 
Appendix Table A2. Summary of the Design of the Laboratory Experiment 
 
 Control  (Croatian  Radio) B92 Serbian  Radio 
Treatment 
RTS Serbian Radio 
Treatment 
5 min  News on neutral Croatian Radio (Imports of natural gas in Croatia secured for the 
next three years, news on trading in shares of the INA company, Workers of Trimot, 
government owned company in Imotski, will be paid their outstanding wages for 
previous 6 months)  
2 min   Song:  




 Jelena Karleuša – 
Insomnia 
(Neutral Serbian song) 
Song:  
Ceca -Lepi grome moj 
(Loaded Serbian song) 
3 min  News on neutral Croatian Radio  2 (News on the process of extradition of Croatian 
former Prime Minister from the Republic of Austria to Croatian judiciary, Austrian 
prosecution for his involvement in money laundering, INTERPOL discovered his 
secret accounts,  Sanadres’s involvement in the affair Hypo Alpe-Adria-Bank) 
30 sec.  Signature tune of Croatian 
radio 
Signature tune of B92  Signature tune of RTS Radio 
Belgrad 
2 min  Song:  
Magazin -Sijamski blizanci 
(Croatian song) 
Song:  
Željko Samardžić - 
9000 metara 
(Neutral Serbian song) 
Song:  
Riblja Čorba - Letovanje  
(Loaded Serbian song) 
5 min  News from Croatian Radio:  
Awards given for the 
establishment of the first 
Croatian radio in Istra, 
Radio Pula. Awards given  
for contribution to its work 
and for maintaining it in 
unfavorable political 
conditions.  
Museum exhibition of 
mammals that lived on the 
territory of Croatia during 
the last Ice Age has been 
opened. 
News from B92:  
Report by Dick Marty, 
which claims that 
Kosovo Prime 
Minister Hashim Thaci 
was involved in 
trafficking human 
organs form  detained 
Serbian and non-
Albanian civilians  in 
war(1999-2000), has 
been accepted,  
Serbia has great 
interest in discovering 
the full truth about 
war crimes for future 
relations with Kosovo. 
 
News  from RTS Radio 
Belgrad:  
Report by Dick Marty, which 
reports about Kosovo's 
Prime Minister 
HashimaThaci involvement 
in weapon and human 
organs trafficking has been 
accepted,  
Talk about the problems 
that this report carries: 
questions about the 
institutions responsible for 
these crimes, intimidating 
witnesses, many institutions 
were aware of the facts 
disclosed in the report, 
political and judicial 
consequences of the report. 
 
Talk about the significance 
of this report for  Serbia, 
since it itself is investigated 
war crimes committed in 
Kosovo. 
 